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CARRIERS-STIPULATION IN PASSENGER TICKET LIMITING LIABILITY 1OR
LOSS OF BAGGAGE-NEGLIGENCE.-COOPER V. NORFOLK, SOUTHERN Ry. Co.
ET AL., 77 S. E. REP. (N. C.), 339.-Held, that a stipulation in an intra-
state passenger ticket that "baggage liability is limited in value, unless a
greater value has been declared and excess charges paid," is invalid, where
the carrier was negligent.
In general there is no distinction between the baggage of a passen-
ger and ordinary goods, as to the rights of parties to enter into con-
tracts limiting the liability of the carrier. Hutchinson on Carriers, 3rd Ed.,
§1297. The decision in the principal case is in harmony with the rule
obtaining in most jurisdictions that a carrier may limit its liability for bag-
gage by stipulation in a passenger ticket, except for losses due to its own
negligence; Williams v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 93 App. Div.
(N. Y.), 582; Thomas v. Southern Ry., 131 N. C., 590; Jacobs v. C. R. of
N. J., 208 Pa., 535; although some require that a reduced fare or other
consideration be given. Robert v. Chi. & Alton R. Co., 148 Mo. App., 96.
The stipulation must be reasonable; Weinberger v. Compagnie Generale,
146 Fed., 516; Rose v. Northern Pacific Ry., 35 Mont., 70; and notice must
usually be brought home to the passenger; C. R. of N. J. v. Wiegand,
75 Fed., 370; Black v. A. C. Line Ry., 82 S. C., 478; although it may be
presumed. Aiken v. Wabash Ry., 80 Mo. App., 8; Jacobs v. C. R. of IV. J.,
supra. Notice will not be presumed where the conditions intended to
limit the carrier's liability are printed on the back of the ticket. Hutchil-
son on Carriers, §1299. Some courts however allow a limitation of lia-
bility for loss caused by negligence. Rose v. N. P. Ry. supra; Westhall v.
C. R. of N. J., 79 N. J. L., 87; Tewes v. North German Lloyd Steamship
Co., 186 N. Y., 151. In a few instances, as where a free pass is given, a
carrier may wholly exempt itself from liability; Holly v. Southern Ry.,
119 Ga., 767; even for the felonious acts of its servants. Marriott v.
Yeoward Bros., 2 K. B. (Eng., 1909), 987; contra, Hutto v. Southern Ry.,
75 S. C., 295. In Iowa, Texas and Virginia, by statute, a carrier cannot
limit its common-law liability. Galveston, etc. Ry. v. Eales, 33 Tex. Civ.
App., 457; C. & 0. Ry. v. Beasley, 104 Va., 788. Stipulations as to bag-
gage are held not to apply to hand baggage. Runyan v. C. R. of N. J.,
61 N. J. L., 537; Holmes v. Nor. Ger. L. S. S. Co., 184 N. Y., 280.
CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTION - DONATION - ENFORCEMENT - CONSIDERA-
TION.-YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASS'N. V. ESTILL, 78 S. E. (GA.), 1075.-
Held, that, as a general rule, a promise to donate money to a charitable
purpose is gratuitous and unenforcible, unless some consideration therefor
exists. But a consideration for a promise to donate money to a char-
itable corporation is supplied where the corporation, during the life of the
promisor, and before a withdrawal of the promise, and in reliance on his
promise, as well as that of others, expended money and incurred en-
forcible liabilities in furtherance of the enterprise the donors intended to
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promote. The original gratuitous promise will thus be converted into a
valid and enforcible contract.
A subscription is generally regarded as merely an offer to contribute
toward the accomplishment of a proposed object ,and being no more than
an offer, it does not give rise to a contractual obligation until supported
by a consideration. Albany Presb. Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y., 517.
Nevertheless, the meritorious purposes which are usually the object of
subscriptions have led the courts in most cases to hold that subscribers'
promises are enforcible. Different reasons have ben given for holding
the subscriber. If the work for which the promise was made has been
done or liability incurred in regard to such work, on the faith of the sub-
scription,, consideration is found in that fact. First Church v. Donnell,
110 Ia., 5; Richelieu v. Inter. Mil. Encamp. Co., 140 Ill., 248; Cottage St.
Church v. Kendall 120 Mass., 528; 1 Page on Contr., par. 298. See also,
Lasar -p. Johnson, 125 Cal., 549. While the cases that allow recovery
on the ground of expenditures made, or work done, in reliance on the sub-
scription, usually state th e reason in terms of consideration, it has been
held that the right of recovery is on the ground of an estoppel invoked
against the promisor. Beatty v. Wes., College, 177 111., 280, 292; Simpson
College v. Tuttle, 71 Ia., 596; Kansas City School Dist. v. Sheidly, 138
Mo., 672. Being merely an offer, it may be revoked any time before ac-
ceptance. Beach v. First Church, 96 Ill., 177; Helfensteins Estate, 77 Pa.,
328. So, too, it lapses by the death of the subscriber, if the death occurs
before there is an acceptance, and before a consideration is furnished.
Twenty-Third Street Baptist Church v. Connell, 117 N. Y., 601; In re
Helfenstein, supra. Then again, it has been held that the promise of
each subscriber is supported by the promises of the others. Christian
College v. Hendley, 49 Cal., 347; Higert v. Trustees, 53 Ind., 326. Contra.
Cottage St. Church v. Kendall, supra; Albany Presb. Church v. Cooper,
supra. Consideration for the subscriber's promise has also ben found
either in the express promise, or in what is regarded as the implied prom-
ise, of the promisee to carry out the purpose for which the subscription
was made. Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 Ind. App., 103. This view has
not met with judicial approval. Johnson v. Otterbein University, 41 Ohio
St., 527, 531. The fact that others have been induced to subscribe has
been held, in a few cases, to be a good consideration. Hanson Trustees
,. Stetson, 5 Pick. (Mass.), 606. overruled in Cottage St. Church v. Ken-
dall, supra; Comstock v. Howd, 15 Mich., 237; Irwin v. Lombard Univ.,
56 Ohio St., 9. Recovery is also allowed where the promisor expressly
or impliedly requests that acts be done in furtherance of the purpose of
the subscription, and they are performed pursuant to the request. Union
Semin. v. Brownell, 34 N. Y., 379; Keuka Coll. v. Ray, 167 N. Y., 96;
Albany Presb. Church v. Cooper, supra. A few cases hold that the
object being meritorious and beneficial to the promisor, this benefit to
him furnishes a good consideration for the promise. Pitt. v. Gentle, 49
Mo., 74, 77; Comstock v. Howd, supra. While in most cases there is a
strong moral obligation to pay the promised subscription, there are but
few cases where the subscription has been enforced explicitly on this
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moral obligation consideration. Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. St., 416; Harts
Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.), 226. In England a charitable subscription is not
held to be binding. In re Hudson, 54 L. J. Ch., 811. The doctrine of the
principal case illustrates the tendency of the courts to discover a tech-
nical consideration for the promise of the subscriber, and is in accord
with the weight of authority.
CONTRACTS-DIScHARGE BY IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE.-GREIL
BROS. Co. v. MABSON, 60 So. REP. (ALA.), 876.-Dictum, where perform-
ance of a contract becomes impossible subsequent to its making, the
promisor is not thereby discharged, unless the impossibility of perform-
ance is caused by a change in the law, or by some action or authority of
the government, in which case he is discharged.
While impossibility of performance was originally regarded as in no
case an excuse for the non-performance of a contract, three well recog-
nized exceptions to this general rule have arisen. A defense is admitted
where, without fault of either party, performance has been prevented by
the destruction of the subject matter of the contract, by a new law for-
bidding the act promised, or by sickness or death of the parties to a
contract for personal services. 10 Columbia Law Review, 83; but see Vogt
v. Hecker, 118 Wis., 306. Intervention of a foreign law is considered as
impossibility of fact and no defense for non-performance of a contract.
Tweedle Trading Co. v. McDonald, 114 Fed. Rep., 985. In Louisiana, by
statute, interference by a fortuitous event excuses. Romero v. Newman,
50 La. Ann., 80; see also Johnson v. Lyon, 75 Mich., 477. In New York,
impossibility is also an excuse when caused by the non-continuance of
conditions essential to performance. Buffalo & C. Land Co. v,. Bellevue
Land & C. Co., 165 N. Y., 247. Where the impossibility is caused by
fault of the promisor he is not excused; Frothingham v. Seymour, 121
Mass., 409; and so a legislative enactment made at his instance is of no
benefit to him; Re Companies' Acts, 117 L. T. R. 60 (Eng., Ch. D.);
although voluntary dissolution of a partnership promisor has been held
a valid excuse. Bovine v. Dent, 21 T. L. R., 82 (Eng., K. B. D.)
Fault of the promisee makes impossibility resulting therefrom a discharge
of the promisor from his obligation. Vandegrift v. Cowles Eng. Co., 161
N. Y., 435. In addition to being opposed to the great weight of author-
ity, the Alabama court's statement of law seems altogether too stringent.
For further discussion of this topic see Wald's Pollock on Contracts,
Williston's 3rd Ed, p. 518 et seq; and see article on "Discharge of Con-
tracts" by Arthur L. Corbin in 22 Yale Law Journal, 531.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF JUDICIARY-REVIEW OF ACTION OF
GOVERNOR.-GERMAINE v. FERRIS, GOVERNOR, 124 N. W., 738.-Held, that
the oficial action of a governor in removing, pursuant to authority con-
ferred by law, the mayor of a city cannot be reviewed by certiorari, nor
can mandamus issue, without an invasion by the judiciary of the execu-
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tive function of government, as conferred by that article of the Consti-
tution dividing the powers into legislative, executive and judicial depart-
ments, and declaring that no person in one department shall exercise the
powers belonging to another.
There is no opposition in the decisions to the proposition that man-
damus will not issue to compel governors to exercise political or discre-
tionary functions, nor may the courts review their acts under such circum-
stances. Miles v. Bradford, 22 Md., 170; Tenn. & Coosa R. R. v. Moore,
36 Ala., 371. The weight of American authority is also against the issue
of mandamus to governors in the performance of mere ministerial acts.
State v. Warmoth, 22 La. Ann., 1; Hawkins v. the Governor, 1 Ark., 571;
State v. the Governor, 39 Mo., 388; People v. the Governor, 29 Mich., 320;
Chamberlain v. Libley, 4 Minn., 309; State v. Drew, 17 Fla., 67; People v.
Bissell, 19 Ill., 229. Nor will the fact that the duty might have been
entrusted to'another than the governor alter the matter. In re Dennett,
32 Me., 508. This rule has been extended to protect the governor as an
ex officio member of a public board. People v. Morton, 156 N. Y., 136.
Nor will mandamus issue against a governor in his military capacity
rather than his civil, though the duty be purely ministerial. Mauran v.
Smith, 8 R. I., 192. In some jurisdictions, however, if the governor
answer the writ without objecting to the validity of the action, and aver
his willingness to perform, mandamus will issue, 6 Lea., 12 (Tenn.), though
this is denied in one state at least. State v. Stone, 120 Mo., 428. It also
results from the sovereignty of each state that mandamus will not issue
from the Federal courts to the governor of a state, whether the duty
be ministerial or not. Commonwealth v'. Dennison, 24 How., 66. There
is, nevertheless, a strong current of authority that the governor may be
required to perform duties merely ministerial. Groome v. Gwinn, 43 Ind.,
572; Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal., 596; Gray v. State, 72 Ind., 567. So
where a banking company had complied with the requirements of a
statute of incorporation, the governor was compelled to issue a proclama-
tion declaring it in esse, State v. Chase, 5 Ohio St., 528; and a governor
has been required to draw a warrant upon the treasurer for salary due a
state officer, Magruder v. Swan, 25 Md., 173; and on the principle that
mandamus will issue when such an official refuses to act at all, mandamus
will lie to determine whether there is a vacancy. Attorney General v.
Taggart, 66 N. H., 362. In these states, it is noteworthy, that refusal or
neglect of the duty must clearly appear. In re Cunningham, 14 Kan., 416.
The right must be clear and the duty imperative, State v. Humphrey, 47
Kan., 561; and the mandamus will never issue if the act would be useless
or nugatory. People v. State Canal Board, 13 Barb., 432. The basis for
these decisions rests, apparently, in the last analysis, upon obiter dicta
by Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 49, for there
all the court decided was that it could not take jurisdiction under a statute
which was held -unconstitutional. In England, Lord Mansfield is author-
ity for the statement that ".whenever there is a right to execute an office
and a person is kept out of possession, and has no other remedy, this
court ought to assist by mandamus," King v. Baker et al, 3 Burrows, 1266,
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and mandamus was held to lie against the Lords of the Treasury to com-
pel them to pay money granted by Parliament to a private person. Rex v.
Lords Commissioners, 4 A. & E., 286. The American conflict of author-
ities is irreconcilable..
HOMICIDE-SELF-DEFENSE-RIGHT TO INVOKE.--UNDERWOOD V. STATE,
60 So. REP. (ALA.), 842.-Held, that to invoke the right of self-defense,
one must have been free from all fault on provoking the difficulty with
deceased.
There are several well established exceptions to the general rule laid
down by the court. One who provokes a difficulty may defend himself
against violence on the part of the one provoked if it is disproportionate to
the seriousness of the provocation or greater than the law recognizes as jus-
tifiable under the circumstances. Sams v. State, 124 Ga., 25; Bennyfield v.
Commonwealth, 13 Ky. L. R., 446. If the aggressor abandons the con-
flict, and is subsequently murderously assaulted, and kills in self-defense,
he is not estopped to plead self-defense; but the withdrawal must be in
such manner as to manifest clearly to his adversary his intention in good
faith to desist. Jackson v. State, 2 Ala. App., 55; Ferguson v. State, 95
Ark., 428; Padgett v. State, 40 Fla., 451. State v. -Kellogg, 104 La., 580.
In a few states, the aggressor is not deprived of his right to take the life
of another in self-defense unless his acts of provocation were committed
with malicious intention. Foutch v. State, 95 Tenn., 711; Thornton v. State,
65 S. W., 1105 (Tex. Cr. App., 1901); Hash v. Commonwealth, 88 Va.,
172; State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va., 228; see also State v. Kretschmar, 232
Mo., 29.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.-FLANAGAN V.
McLANE, 87 ATL. (CONN.), 727; 88 ATL., 96.-Held, that where a woman
suspected a workman of having stolen money and had written her sus-
picious to a constable asking him to investigate, a second letter written
by her stating that she had found the money "in a place where we would
never have put it", and that she would do no more about the matter, but
that she still believed the workman to have stolen it, was a privileged com-
munication if made honestly and in good faith. Roraback and Wheeler,
JJ., dissenting.
Words which charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime
involving moral turpitude or subjecting the offender to infamous punish-
ment are slanderous per se. Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn., 23; Dennehy v.
O'Connell, 66 Conn., 175. But an occasion of privilege exists if the
admitted circumstances under which an alleged libel is published are such
that the law recognizes a duty on the part of the defendant to make the
communication. Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn., 504. Upon
grounds of public policy communications which would otherwise be libel-
ous are protected if they are made in good faith in the prosecution of an
inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed, and for the purpose
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of bringing to punishment the criminal. Chapman v. Battle, 124 Ga., 574;
Eames v. Whittaker, 123 Mass., 342; Cristman v. Cristman, 36 IlI. App.,
567. The majority of the court on the principal case held that the letter
was still within the privilege of the defendant, in that the re-affirmation
of her belief in the plaintiff's guilt was "for the guidance of the officer in
case it was or might become his duty to pursue the investigation with a
view to criminal proceedings." The dissenting opinion held that the
letter, since it was written to stop any action by the officer in her behalf,
did not come within the class of privileged communications.
PARENT AND CHILD-LIABILITY OF STEPFATHER-SUPPORT OF CHILD.-
WHITE V. McDOWELL, 132 PAc. REP. (WASH.), 734.-Held, that there is a
duty upon a stepfather to support minor children of his wife by a former
husband, which duty is something more than mere charity, and where the
stepfather willingly fulfills that duty, recovery cannot be had by the wife
against her divorced former husband for support of a child who was
awarded to her custody.
A husband was not by the common law obliged" to support the chil-
dren of his wife by a former marriage. Worcester v. Marchant, 31 Mass.,
510. And generally he is not required to support them unless he has
voluntarily assumed the parental relation to them under circumstances
that raise a presumption that he has undertaken to support them gratui-
tously. Kenpson v. Goss, 69 Ark, 451. Nor is he required to support
them where neither wife nor child resides with him. Freeman v. Freeman,
11 Ky. L. R., 822. The doctrine of the principal case is correct, however,
to the extent that if a stepfather voluntarily assumes the care and sup-
port of a stepchild he stands in loco parentis, and under those circum-
stances the ordinary rules governing the parental relation will be held to
apply. Burba v. Richardson, 14 Ky. L. R., 233; Kirchgassner v. Rodick,
170 Mass., 543; In re Besondy, 32 Minn., 387; Sharp v. Cropsey, 11 Barb.
(N. Y.), 224; Grossman v. Lauber, 29 Ind., 618. The stepfather cannot
then ask compensation for maintenance of his stepchildren; Swetman, v.
Swetman, 8 Ky. L. R., 266; and the stepchildren cannot ask compensation,
for services rendered in the absence of contract. Kirchgassner v. Rodick,
supra; Dixon v. Hosick, 101 Ky., 231; the stepfather has a right to the
services of the stepchildren and is liable to them for their support. Mul-
hern v. Macdavitt, 82 Mass., 405; Livingston v. Hammond, 162 Mass.,
375; Gillett v. Camp, 27 Mo., 541; and in case of injury to the children,
a right of action to recover for loss of services is given him to the ex-
clusion of the mother. Eickhoff v. Sedalia, etc., Ry., 106 Mc. App., 541.
A distinction arises, however, where the stepfather is also guardian of
his stepchildren and has funds of the latter under his control. He may
then be allowed to apply a part of such funds to the support of his wards.
Latham v. Myers, 57 Ia., 519; In re Ward's Estate, 73 Mich., 220; Mull
vs. Walker, 100 N. C., 46; even though the stepchildren be members of
his own family. Pratt v. Baker, 56 Vt., 70; contra, it matter of Dissenger,
39 N. J. Eq., 227. It has been held, too, that the marriage of a woman,
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who has been appointed and qualified as guardian of her infant children
by her former husband, has the effect of joining her husband with her in
the guardianship and that he then has the undeniable right to charge his
wards a reasonable sum for their board. Martin v. Foster's Executor,
38 Ala., 688. The relation of parent and child may be severed, however,
and a charge made for support furnished thereafter. A severance is
effected by the death of the mother or by the stepfather's withdrawal from
the home of the stepchildren, where he. has been living with them. Kemp-
son v. Goss, 69 Ark., 451; Meyer v. Teminme, 72 Ill., 574; Rawson v. Cor-
bett, 43 Ill. App., 127. Charge for support may also be made where there
has been an express contract to that effect. In re Ackerman, 116 N. Y., 654;
Brown's Appeal, 112 Pa. St., 18; McCormick Minors' Estate, 1 Pa. Co. Ct.,
517. But a stepfather cannot maintain, under ordinary circumstances, a
claim against the children of his wife for improvements made during
their minority upon their lands, of which he was in possession under no
right except his wife's tnassigned right of dower and his relation of step-
father. Guckian v. Riley, 135 Mass., 71; Haggerty v. McCanna, 25 N. J.
Eq., 48; Springfield v. Bethel, 90 Ky., 593.
